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The last convention of states ever held?

The last convention of states ever held?

I recently obtained the records of what may be the last convention of states ever held—records demonstrating that states were meeting in convention well into the mid 20th century.

A “convention of states” as the American Founders and subsequent generations understood the term, is a temporary conclave of legislatively-authorized representatives from three or more states. It is both a diplomatic gathering—the representatives or “commissioners” are essentially ambassadors from their respective legislatures—and a problem-solving task force. Sometimes representatives of sovereignties other than states, such as Indian tribes or the federal government (or, in colonial times, the British crown), have been invited to participate. Conventions of states also have been called “committees of states,” “congresses,” and “commissions.”

Conventions of states, both national (“general”) and regional (“partial”), have met for many different purposes: to plan common defense, work out common responses to political challenges, negotiate treaties with Indian tribes, seek and propose solutions to economic problems, propose constitutional amendments, and, on two occasions (Philadelphia in 1787 and Montgomery in 1861) to prepare new constitutions. Only the last two can properly be called constitutional conventions.

In the 20th century, states used them to hammer out western water compacts. I previously reported on the Santa Fe Convention of 1922, formally called the Colorado River Compact Commission. It was the gathering of seven states and a federal commissioner, then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.  It negotiated the Colorado River Compact. I also have reported that similar gatherings met to negotiate the Rio Grande River Compact and an abortive North Platte River compact. My latest acquisition is the official record of the convention that negotiated the compact covering the Upper Colorado River —the portion north and east of Lee Ferry, Arizona.

This was a true convention among five states: Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. It met intermittently from July 22, 1946 to August 5, 1949. Commissioners attended from each state. They were not chosen by their legislatures directly, but legislative statutes authorized the appointment of each and gave each his power. At the request of the states, President Truman named a federal representative to participate as well: Harry W. Bashore, formerly Commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.

The group’s assignment was to divide up the waters of the Upper Colorado River among the five states and determine how much each state had to provide to the states of the Lower Colorado River. This was a highly technical task. Accordingly, unlike most conventions (but like the Santa Fe meeting) there was only one commissioner from each state, but each was assisted by a technical staff. In addition, the group created an engineering advisory committee and a legal advisory committee. The technical nature of the job was why the group had to keep adjourning and reassembling: Engineering studies and negotiations over local streams were performed in the interim.

Another interesting variation is that, like the 1922 convention, the Upper Colorado River group met in different cities and towns at different times: Cheyenne, Wyoming; Denver, Colorado; Salt Lake City and Vernal, Utah; and Santa Fe, New Mexico. In addition, it held public hearings in four other towns. In all, there were 41 days of sessions grouped into eleven formal “meetings.” The first eight meetings led to completion of the compact in 1948. The remaining three, held the following year, were short sessions for wrapping up business.

The conclave also gave itself a name, since its authorizing documents didn’t specify one. It called itself the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact Commisssion.

Within those variations, the group operated according to standard convention of states protocols. Specifically:

* The commissioners established their own procedures. Thus, they made it clear that a preliminary meeting that included the state governors did not bind them, and they re-voted on the decisions made at that preliminary meeting.

* Each state had one vote, cast by its commissioner, no matter how many people from each state happened to be present. After briefly considering a unanimity rule (such as the Colorado River Commission adopted but eventually abandoned), the group retained a rule of decision by a majority. However, it strove for unanimity, and generally was successful. The federal representative had no vote.

* The commissioners elected their own officers: As has been typical among interstate conventions the chairman was a commissioner and the secretary was not. Although he could not vote, Mr. Bashore was elected chairman.

* The record reproduces many roll call votes by states, some quite dramatic. The voting usually was open. But the vote on the overall percentages by which states would divide the river water was by secret ballot.

* The commissioners affirmed that they were negotiating by virtue of the states’ reserved sovereign powers, not by virtue of permission of federal law (as President Truman seemed to think). In this respect, the Upper Colorado River Convention was typical—although a gathering held under Article V would derive its authority from the Constitution rather than from reserved sovereign power.

The proceedings the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact Commission are impressive. The commissioners and staff worked very hard. Most people involved were thoughtful and highly qualified. The engineering studies were voluminous.

Also impressive is the recurrence of some important names. A listed adviser was Ralph Carr, who later as governor of Colorado during World War II, won national attention by opposing the Roosevelt administration’s groundless incarceration of Japanese-American citizens. Another listed adviser was Barry M. Goldwater, later U.S. Senator and the 1964 Republican nominee for President.

The compact the convention negotiated was approved by all five states and by Congress. It is still in effect. It created a permanent administrative body called the Upper Colorado River Commission, to whose staff I am grateful for loaning me the convention record.

Fake News: How Two Leading Newspapers Spread the “Runaway Convention” Story in the 1960s & 1970s

Fake News: How Two Leading Newspapers Spread the “Runaway Convention” Story in the 1960s & 1970s

Although there were scattered antecedents, “runaway convention” claims and certain associated myths were first distributed widely during the 1960s and 1970s. In a previous Article V Information Center study, I documented how those stories were publicized by leading opinion-molders in national liberal establishment. Their goal was to disable the Article V convention process to prevent proposal of constitutional amendments to restrain the federal government.

Now a new Article V Information Center study shows how the two leading newspapers of the same liberal establishment worked with those opinion-molders. During the 1960s and 1970s, the New York Times and the Washington Post not only opposed a convention editorially, but their skewed their news stories to promote fake news “runaway” claims.

You can find the new study here.

How progressives Promoted the ‘Runaway Convention’ Myth to Protect the Warren Court’s Judicial Activism

How progressives Promoted the ‘Runaway Convention’ Myth to Protect the Warren Court’s Judicial Activism

You may have heard alarms that if we hold a national convention for proposing constitutional amendments the gathering would be an uncontrollable constitutional convention (“con-con”) that could propose anything at all.

The claim is called the “runaway scenario.” It has almost no basis in history or law. But it has long frightened Americans away from using the Constitution’s chief mechanism for bypassing Congress and curing our dysfunctional federal government.

The “runaway” specter has been raised by fringe elements on both the left and the right. It is a ghost that haunts the imagination of groups like the John Birch Society and Common Cause.

Now we have more information about how it was conjured up.

Last year, the Article V Information Center published my paper showing that confusion between an amendments convention and a constitutional convention first arose in the 20th century. The paper further documents how, during the 1960s and 1970s, leading establishment liberals, such as Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen and Kennedy confidant Arthur Goldberg, capitalized on that confusion by raising the runaway specter.

The paper concluded that their plan was to scare people away from using the Constitution’s convention mechanism. Their goals were twofold. First, they wanted to protect from reversal by constitutional amendment several Supreme Court decisions that had proved highly controversial—among them Roe v. Wade, the case that legalized abortion nationwide. Second, they sought to block growing momentum for amendments imposing term limits and requiring a federal balanced budget.

Now the curator of the Article V Library has produced more evidence confirming these conclusions.

The Article V Library collects every state legislative resolution calling for an amendments convention. It also offers features for screening them by subject and for ascertaining which are still in effect.

Without prior knowledge of my own conclusions, Robert Biggerstaff, the library’s curator, conducted an n-gram search in Google Books to find out when the phrase “runaway convention” arose (now updated to 2008, the last year for which data are available). He discovered that the term was almost unknown until around 1960—when it suddenly became extraordinarily common. Usage rose to counter rising popular demand for constitutional amendments. In the 1990s, as momentum for amendments abated, so also did resort to the runaway scenario. Another n-gram searchshows that the abbreviation “con con,” widely used by convention opponents, also was invented around 1960.

Biggerstaff notes: “In the 1950’s and 60’s progressives actively sought change through courts when it was not possible through legislatures.  This was an express tactical choice to seek through judicial activism what was stymied by legislatures.”

However, their strategy had what he calls an “Achilles’ heel.” Supreme Court decisions can be—and several times have been—overturned by constitutional amendment. After the Supreme Court required states to reapportion their legislatures in the 1960s, for example, 33 of the necessary 34 state legislatures filed applications demanding a convention to propose an amendment reversing the court’s rulings.

“As a result,” Biggerstaff says, “it became important to neuter the Article V Amendment process—particularly to prevent triggering by convention applications—to protect progressive successes achieved in the courts.”

Biggerstaff concludes that this was why the runaway convention fiction suddenly emerged from nowhere during the 1960s. In his view, “generating unwarranted fear of the Article V convention process was a ploy introduced by progressives as a way to prevent states from countering progressives’ use of judicial activism.”

This article originally appeared in The Hill.

How We Know a National Amendments Convention Is a ‘Convention of the States’

How We Know a National Amendments Convention Is a ‘Convention of the States’

Most state legislatures have filed applications with Congress demanding a national convention for proposing constitutional amendments. Americans are asking just what kind of convention the Constitution requires.Nearly all experts believe an amendments convention is a “convention of the states”—the traditional term for a meeting in which representatives of state legislatures deliberate on the basis of sovereign equality. The rule at a convention of the states is that each state has an equal voice.

This would be a familiar procedure: There have been about 40 conventions of states in American history—although this one would be the first called to propose constitutional amendments under the authority of the Constitution itself.

Other commentators—predominately, but not exclusively, convention opponents—argue an amendments convention should consist of popularly elected delegates, perhaps allocated by population.

The Constitution itself merely refers to the assembly as a “Convention for proposing Amendments.” So we must look at history to understand how the Founders understood the term.

In an 1831 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court said an amendments convention is a convention of the states. My newly-issued research study confirms the Supreme Court was correct.

During the century before the Constitution was drafted, conventions among North American colonies, and later among states, met on average every three or four years. After Independence in 1776, the pace quickened: The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was the 11th interstate gathering in 11 years. All were assemblies of state delegations, operating as ambassadors from their respective states.

The delegates were officially called “commissioners” and the meetings dubbed either “conventions of the states” or by some well-recognized synonym.

The fact that the founders knew only of the “convention of the states” model of interstate meeting suggests strongly they intended an amendments convention to work the same way. The new study shows how the “convention of states” approach fits within the Constitution they drafted and approved.

Additionally, the study collects numerous documents in which Founders specifically labeled an amendments convention a “convention of the states.” All these documents originated when Americans still were debating the new Constitution. Remarkably, everyone seems to have shared the view that an amendments convention would be a “convention of the states,” irrespective of whether he favored the Constitution.

For example, in New York legislative debates, two lawmakers referred to an amendments convention as a “convention of the states.” One was John Lansing Jr., who had served as a framer in Philadelphia. Similarly, in South Carolina, another framer, Charles Cotesworth Pinkney, referred to the amendments convention in much the same way.

Newspaper articles used the same term. Leading founders such as George Washington, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton made comments that reveal their assumption that an amendments convention is a convention of the states.

Perhaps most persuasive of all are the references to “convention of the states” in state legislative resolutions and other government documents. During 1788 and 1789, several state legislatures debated whether to formally apply to Congress for a convention, primarily to obtain a bill of rights. The very first application, passed by the Virginia legislature, used the term “convention of the states,” and the second (New York’s) used a common synonym.

The study observes: “Within a few months amid the ratification debates, five states in different regions of the country—three in favor, one against, and one neutral—issued seven official documents identifying an amendments convention as a convention of the states.”

For a such a gathering, the state legislatures decide how many commissioners to send to the convention and how they are chosen. Previous experience suggests state legislatures will select most commissioners. That ensures the commissioners are experienced in public policy and official drafting.

When the convention is called to order, each delegation will have an equal voice. Although the assembly theoretically could change that rule, no convention of states ever has.

If delegations from all 50 states attend, then 26 will be able to propose an amendment. Their proposal will, however, be merely a proposal. To become part of the Constitution, three-fourths of the states (38) must approve, thereby assuring the amendment has strong popular support.

This article originally appeared in Townhall.com

Yes, the Constitution was adopted legally

Yes, the Constitution was adopted legally

An old myth has showed up in the media again: the myth that delegates to the 1787 Constitution Convention violated their trust—that they produced a new constitution although empowered only to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation.

Fortunately, the claim that the 1787 convention had no authority to propose a new constitution is pure fiction. I have made the point before, but a new article by constitutional lawyer Michael Farris rebuts the myth in detail.

Its core error is the mistaken belief that the convention was called by a limited February 21, 1787 resolution of the Confederation Congress. In fact, as the wording of that resolution suggests, it was not the convention call.

Conventions of states had long been a staple of American life. They were not held pursuant to the Articles of Confederation. They operated outside the Articles, under sovereign powers reserved to the states.

Here’s how the process worked: First, an official authority, usually a state legislature, would issue a “call” inviting states to meet to address one or more issues. Then each participating state would appoint “commissioners” (delegates). The commissioners and the convention operated under then-prevailing rules of agency law. The agenda was limited by the call’s subject matter and by the instructions the majority of participating states gave their commissioners.

During the 1780s, many people thought the Articles of Confederation were inadequate. In September 1786, delegates to the five-state Annapolis Convention recommended to their respective states another convention in Philadelphia “to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”

In the 18th century the word “constitution” usually had a meaning different from that we typically employ today. At the time, “constitution” usually meant the entire political system—just as we still refer to the “unwritten British constitution.” Thus, the Annapolis conclave recommended a convention empowered to propose any changes in the political system deemed “necessary” to render the political system “adequate.”

On November 24, 1786, New Jersey appointed commissioners. On December 1, the Virginia legislature formally approved the convention in language even broader than that used at Annapolis. The Virginia lawmakers then extended an invitation by directing the governor to transmit copies of its resolution to all other states. That invitation—not any congressional resolution—represented the formal call to Philadelphia.

Over the next few weeks, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia all accepted. None limited its delegates to amending the Articles.

In Congress, a committee headed by John Dickinson recommended endorsing Virginia’s broad call. Its recommendation would have been merely a statement of moral support with no legal effect.

But congressional delegates from New York and Massachusetts were concerned about the breadth of the call. They wanted Congress to recommend limiting the convention to amending the Articles.

Congress compromised: Instead of a recommendation one way or another, it simply stated an “opinion” that a convention should be held to amend the Articles. This is the resolution often mistaken for the call.

But this resolution had no legal effect, and the call had already been issued. Seven states already had announced participation on wider terms. They were soon joined by South Carolina, Connecticut, and Maryland.

Thus, when twelve states met in Philadelphia, ten had given their commissioners sweeping proposal powers. This led Gouverneur Morris to observe that the convention was authorized to “propose any thing.”

Eventually, the convention decided to propose an entirely new document. Of the commissioners from the two states without full power, most never signed the Constitution. One who did sign (Alexander Hamilton of New York), acted as an individual, not as a representative of his state.

Pursuant to the instructions set forth in most of the state commissions, the convention sent the Constitution to Congress. Congress unanimously sent it to the states for ratification. Eventually, popular conventions in all 13 states approved it.

All of this seems quite regular. So where did the myth of the runaway convention arise? Why has it been so persistent?

It began with opponents of the Constitution, among whom legal knowledge was not a strong point. The myth has been kept alive by people—including some academics—who are unaware of 18th century law, terminology, and convention practice.

Unfortunately, fringe groups whose idea of “defending” the Constitution is arguing that it was adopted illegally assiduously continue to perpetuate the myth.

This article originally was published in The Hill.